

BEFORE THE ARIZONA CORPORATION COMMISSION

COMMISSIONERS

GARY PIERCE

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BY DIALAROUND ENTERPRISES INC.

BACKGROUND

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF STI PREPAID, LLC AND DIALAROUND ENTERPRISES INC. FOR APPROVAL OF A TRANSFER OF ASSETS AND CERTIFICATE OF CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY TO PROVIDE INTRASTATE TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES AND APPROVAL OF TERMINATION OF SERVICE

KRISTIN K. MAYES - Chairman 7009 JUN 18 P 3: 03

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DOCKET NO. T-04045A-07-0135

STAFF'S POST-HEARING BRIEF

On March 2, 2007, STi Prepaid, LLC ("STi") and Dialaround Enterprises, Inc. ("DEI") (together "Applicants") filed an application before the Arizona Corporation Commission ("ACC" or "Commission") requesting authority to transfer DEI's assets and Certificate of Convenience and Necessity ("CC&N") to provide resold interexchange services from DEI to STi and to cancel DEI's CC&N for those services.

On April 3, 2007, Staff issued a Letter of Sufficiency and on January 9, 2009, Staff filed with Commission Docket Control its Staff Report in this matter. The Staff Report recommends approval of STi's application, subject to an extensive list of conditions.

On May 4, 2009, STi filed its exceptions to the Staff Report. On that same day, a prehearing conference was held in which the Hearing Division advised the parties as to certain information the parties were to present at the hearing in this matter.

On May 18, 2009, hearing was conducted in this matter. At the close of hearing, the Hearing Division directed the parties to file closing briefs. The parties were directed to include in the briefs a discussion of three specific issues: 1) the necessity of the Commission to address STi Prepaid's general concerns within the context of Generic Rulemaking docket; 2) the applicability to the instant proceedings of the preemption provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 253; and 3) the appropriate treatment of a performance bond as applied under the circumstances of the instant case.

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Staff hereby files its closing brief as directed.

II. STAFF'S GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS

Staff believes that STi has the technical expertise to provide intrastate long distance service, has the financial resources with which to remain a viable provider, and is a fit and proper entity to provide the requested services. Staff has therefore recommended that the Commission approve the application.

However, during the course of investigating this application, Staff received information regarding a series of legal actions in other jurisdictions. Of particular concern was an action taken by the Florida Office of the Attorney General in which several purveyors of prepaid calling cards were investigated for fraudulent business practices. Among those companies were STi Phonecard, Inc., which was a sub-entity of the generic STi brand name⁴ and an affiliate of Telco Group, Inc.⁵, which was owned by Mr. Samer Tawfik.⁶ STi Prepaid later purchased the assets of Telco Group, Inc. and Mr. Tawfik is a 25 percent owner of STi Prepaid⁷, although the company testified that he will have no day-to-day responsibilities with STi.⁸

At the conclusion of the Florida action, STi Phonecard and Telco Group entered into an agreement with the State of Florida, titled Assurance of Voluntary Compliance, admitted at hearing as Exhibit A-30, which spelled out the many restrictions and outright prohibitions found during the investigation to be necessary to protect consumers. Staff reviewed the document and found many of the compliance items to be valuable to Arizona consumers as well.

Staff then obtained a copy of the prepared statement of the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") on Prepaid Calling Cards, which was admitted at hearing as Exhibit S-2. In short, the FTC statement weighed in on the state of the prepaid calling card industry in general and made several recommendations of its own.

Transcript, p. 130: 24.

² Tr., 131: 3-6.

³ Tr., 131: 7-11

⁴ Tr., 69: 10-14

³ Tr., 69: 17-19.

¹r., 09: 24-70: 2

[′] *Tr.* 70: 9-11. ⁸ *Tr.*. 70: 19-21.

⁹ Tr., 134: 21- 135:3.

Having reviewed all of this information, Staff concluded that while STi's application should be approved, there was sufficient reason to believe that the kind of regulatory practices and restrictions that STi had agreed to as a result of the Florida action are necessary to provide security to Arizona consumers and ratepayers who choose to use STi's services. The absence of these conditions would significantly reduce Staff's confidence in the proposed application, such that absent these conditions, the application should be denied.

III. ADDITIONAL ISSUES

Although in substance STi does not appear to dispute Staff's recommendation for approval of its application, STi does not believe the Commission has the authority to impose several of the recommendations Staff has included for the protection of Arizona consumers.

STi's exceptions center on two central arguments:

- 1) First, STi argues that the Commission's approval of this application, subject to Staff's recommended conditions, would amount to an "unlawful rulemaking"; and
- 2) If the Commission approved the application, subject to Staff's recommended conditions, and if those conditions only apply to STi, then the Commission's action would "have the effect of prohibiting the ability of [STi] to provide ... intrastate telecommunications service", a violation of 47 U.S.C. § 253.

Staff disagrees.

A. Rulemaking Implications.

Essentially, STi argues if the Commission applies these conditions only to STi, the company would be subject to a condition that limits its ability to compete within the telecommunications market against other telecommunications service providers who are not subject to these same restrictions. Therefore, STi argues, the Commission must apply the objectionable conditions to all providers, or none at all. However, according to STi, even if the Commission were to begin applying these recommendations to all Arizona telecommunications providers, the practice would amount to a rulemaking on the issue, which STi argues would be improper due to a lack of notice to the public and the affected utilities. Therefore, the Commission lacks the authority to impose these conditions either to the industry as whole (absent a formal rule-making), or to STi in particular. Staff disagrees.

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Staff does not dispute STi's general references to the Arizona Administrative Code, including the specific references to Rulemaking. However, Staff believes the references are inaccurately applied. It is also worth noting that the Commission already has in place rules governing intrastate long distance telecommunications services. STi is merely suggesting that supplemental rules must be adopted to cover this unique set of circumstances. Staff believes such an approach would be not only inappropriate under the circumstances, but a massive drain on Commission resources with no foreseeable positive result. Rulemaking on the subject is simply not justified.

In general, Staff supports the concept that ratemaking is better done by implementation of rules and procedures applied on a generic basis. However, not all matters must or even can be addressed in such a manner. This has been recognized by the Arizona Supreme Court in *Arizona Corporation Commission v. Palm Springs Utility Company*, 24 Ariz. App. 124, 536 P.2d 245. The Court clearly acknowledged that when appropriate, rules of general application are desirable. But the Court also very specifically left to the Commission the discretion to act on a case-by-case basis when the circumstances dictated such an approach. The instant matter presents just such a situation.

The instant matter presents a fairly unique factual background in that STi is requesting permission to provide intrastate long distance service that will be paid for exclusively by the use of prepaid calling cards. While STi has argued that prepaid calling cards fall outside the Commission's jurisdiction, Staff disagrees. To the extent that these cards represent the *exclusive* means by which Arizona consumers will access STi's proposed services, the Commission has full authority to act in the interest of the consumers to ensure that the consumers receive the telecommunications services for which they pay. Neither party disputes that the Commission is charged to act in the interest of the public. Neither party disputes that the public has had occasion to take issue with the way in which prepaid phone cards have been marketed and sold across the country. And neither party disputes that the way STi's services in Arizona will be accessed will be through the issuance of prepaid calling cards. Therefore, Staff believes the Commission has authority to protect the public in the instant matter by ensuring that safeguards are in place which have been shown to be appropriate to implement in other jurisdictions.

B. Preemption Pursuant To 47 U.S.C. § 253.

47 U.S.C. § 253 (a) provides, in relevant part, that in general:

"No State or local statute or regulation, or other State or local legal requirement, may prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity to provide any interstate or intrastate telecommunications service."

STi has argued that if the Commission were to implement Staff recommendations the effect of the order would be to prohibit STi from providing its proposed services on a competitive basis with other similarly-situated utilities. Staff disagrees.

STi interprets the language of section (a) too strongly. Immediately following the general restriction language, the statute then addresses State authority in particular in section (b), which provides, in relevant part, that:

"Nothing in this section shall affect the ability of a State to impose, on a competitively neutral basis ... requirements necessary to ... protect the public safety and welfare ... and safeguard the rights of consumers."

In Staff's view, this additional language clearly allows the Commission to impose precisely the types of restrictions Staff has recommended for the protection of Arizona consumers.

In 1999, in *Communications Telesystems International v. California Public Utility Commission*, 196 F.3d 1011, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had the occasion to consider this exact situation. In that matter, the CPUC received more than 56,000 complaints from California consumers that their long distance service had been switched to CTS without their permission, a violation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (the "Act") known as "slamming". After more than a year of investigation the CPUC found that CTS had in fact engaged in slamming and imposed several sanctions against the company, among them a three-year prohibition against providing long distance services within the State of California.

CTS filed suit in federal district court, "arguing that the suspension on the provision of intrastate services is preempted by § 253 of the Act, and should therefore be enjoined." The Court disagreed, citing *Louisiana Public Service Commission v. FCC*, 476 U.S. 355, 368-69, an earlier Supreme Court case which, although settling a dispute under the predecessor to the Act, nonetheless

¹⁰ Communications Telesystems International v. California Public Utility Commission, 196 F.3d 1011, at 1014.

spoke to the issue of State authority. "The United States Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have held that federal preemption of state regulation in the area of telecommunications must be clear and occurs only in limited circumstances." *Id.* "[S]tate action may be preempted only for conduct that is "flagrantly and patently' violative of the constitution," i.e., preemption must be "readily apparent." *Fresh International Corporation v. Agricultural Labor Board*, 805 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1986).

In its discussion of *Louisiana Public Service*, the Ninth Circuit provided a rationale that applies to the instant matter. "The Act was designed to prevent explicit prohibitions on entry by a utility into telecommunications, and thereby to protect competition in the industry while allowing states to regulate to protect consumers against unfair business practices such as slamming." 196 F.3d 1011, at 1017.

In the end, the Ninth Circuit held that "The CPUC has the power to implement regulations that are 'necessary' to 'protect the public' against slamming, which reasonably may include fines or suspensions needed to prevent such unlawful activity." *Id.* And finally, "More crucially, as the CPUC points out, the suspension handed down against CTS need not be necessary to prevent CTS' slamming; rather, it need only be necessary to serve the interests recognized in § 253(b) of protecting the public welfare.

Applied to the instant circumstances, the outcome is clear. The Commission has the authority to impose the conditions Staff has recommended. As the testimony showed, STi acquired the assets of a predecessor which had been part of group of telecommunications service providers who were investigated for fraudulent business practices. As a result, STi, having become the successor in interest to the claims against Telco Group and STi Phonecard, agreed to implement a series of business practices which it agreed would provide protection for consumers. And as the company stated at hearing, it does not find the practices and restrictions outlined in Staff recommendations to be objectionable in and of themselves.

Those same concerns that were addressed in the Florida action are present in Arizona, such that Staff believes that the same conditions under which STi operates in Florida should be the same conditions under which it operates in Arizona.

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Staff Report, p. 9
 Transcript, 133: 6-25.

The Supreme Court has supported Staff's interpretation of the Commission's authority, and the Commission should either approve STi's application, complete with Staff recommendations, or the application should be denied.

C. Performance Bond.

In its Staff Report, Staff recommended that the Commission impose two performance bonds, each in the amount of \$10,000.¹¹ Although Staff traditionally only requires a single bond, in the instant case, given the calling card industry's record of consumer issues, Staff felt that an additional bond would be needed to protect consumers. At hearing, however, Staff withdrew its recommendation regarding the imposition of a second \$10,000 bond, finding a single bond to be sufficient.¹² Staff continues to support the imposition of a single bond. The bond should be issued in the amount of \$10,000 and should be increased by an additional \$5,000 whenever the company's income from sales of prepaid cards reaches \$9,000. Thereafter, the company should post and additional \$5,000 bond each time the income comes within \$1,000 of the total outstanding bond amount.

IV. CONCLUSION

Staff believes that the Commission has the authority to impose any and all of the recommendations Staff has provided in the Staff Report, and in the absence of those conditions, the application should be denied. STi should post a single bond in the amount of \$10,000.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 18TH day of June, 2009.

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